FERC\u27s Dam Decommissioning Authority under the Federal Power Act by Bryant, Beth C.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 74 Number 1 
1-1-1999 
FERC's Dam Decommissioning Authority under the Federal Power 
Act 
Beth C. Bryant 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Beth C. Bryant, Notes and Comments, FERC's Dam Decommissioning Authority under the Federal Power 
Act, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 95 (1999). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol74/iss1/6 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright O 1999 by Washington Law Review Association
FERC'S DAM DECOMMISSIONING AUTHORITY UNDER
THE FEDERAL POWER ACT
Beth C. Bryant
Abstract: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) asserted in a 1994 Policy
Statement that it has the authority under the Federal Power Act to deny a new license for a
hydroelectric dam or impose environmental conditions on a new license that may render a
project unprofitable, when doing so is in the public interest. In addition, FERC stated that it
would impose decommissioning costs on the dam owner. The hydroelectric industry claims
that FERC lacks the authority to take these actions, and that if maintaining a dam is no longer
in the public interest, either the federal government or another party must pay the current
owner to take over the project. To date, FERC has only invoked the Policy Statement twice.
The hydroelectric industry is opposed to both FERC orders, but the FERC Policy Statement
remains untested in court. This Comment analyzes the Federal Power Act in light of FERC's
claimed authority under the Policy Statement and argues that FERC possesses the authority
to deny a license or to impose uneconomic conditions in fulfilling its statutory duty to protect
the public interest.
The hydroelectric industry is in the midst of a major paradigm shift. In
the early 1990s, many original fifty-year hydroelectric licenses granted
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission)'
began to expire.2 Many more licenses are scheduled to expire over the
next several years,3 affecting dams in almost every state.4 Licensees are
eager to get their licenses renewed; in most cases, the dams were
amortized decades ago, and a new license represents almost pure
1. Comprehensive federal involvement in private hydropower development began in 1920 with
the passage of the Federal Water Power Act (FWPA) of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1994)). The Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79z-6 and in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (1994)), amended the
FWPA and changed its title to the Federal Power Act (FPA). FERC assumed the regulatory
functions of the Federal Power Commission (FPC) on October 1, 1977 pursuant to the Department
of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of
3 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C. (1994)). This Comment uses the term
"Commission" interchangeably to refer to both the FPC (prior to October 1977) and FERC
thereafter.
2. One hundred seventy-three licenses expired in 1993 alone. This unprecedented large group of
expiring licenses became known as "The Class of '93" and served as an impetus for new FERC
regulations on license renewal. Donald H. Clarke, Relicensing Hydropower: The Many Faces of
Competition, 11 Nat. Resources & Env't, Fall 1996, at 8, 9.
3. In the years 2000-01, 69 more licenses will expire. Water Power: Use and Regulation of a
Renewable Resource (visited Sept. 23, 1998) <http:lwww.ferc.fed.us/hydro/doeslwaterpwr.htm>.
4. All states have FERC-licensed projects except Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, North Dakota,
and South Dakota. California, Oregon, and Washington are the leading hydropower production
states. Id.
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revenue.' For decades, the Commission freely granted fifty-year licenses
to most applicants6 despite provisions in the Federal Power Act (FPA)7
designed to prevent licensing unless dam construction is consistent with
the public interest.8 Thus, it is not surprising that the Commission earned
a reputation as a friend of the hydroelectricity industry and a nemesis of
environmentalists. 9
Hydroelectric dam licenses now expire in a considerably different
regulatory and economic environment than the one in which they were
originally granted earlier this century. Values and attitudes toward the
environment have changed significantly." The original licenses were
granted prior to passage of many important environmental laws," and
amendments to the FPA itself now force the Commission to consider
explicitly nonpower values in licensing decisions.' In addition,
deregulation of the electric power industry is underway, made possible
by significant technological advances allowing electricity to be
transmitted over vast distances. 3
5. Hence, license renewals are "perhaps even more highly coveted than initial licenses to
construct and operate new hydro-electric facilities." H.R. Rep. No. 99-507, at 14 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496,2501.
6. During the first 60 years of the Commission's existence, it only turned down one proposed
license on recreational and aesthetic grounds. John D. Echeverria et al., Rivers at Risk: The
Concerned Citizen "s Guide to Hydropower 8 (1989).
7. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 791a-828c (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1994). "The Commission and the courts have held the Section 10(a)
standard to be [a] broad public interest standard, requiring consideration of all factors affecting the
public interest." H.R. Rep. No. 99-507, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496, 2499;
see also Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428,450 (1967).
9. According to some FERC observers, FERC is a "renegade agency" that is "utterly oblivious to
the natural world;" the FERC commissioners are "faceless bureaucrats preempting state law, state
rights;" and FERC's decisionmaking process is "fundamentally lawless." Ted Williams, Freeing the
Kennebec River, Audubon, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 36, 36-38.
10. H.R. Rep. No. 99-507, at 18 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496, 2504-05.
11. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994), and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 (1994), now supplement the FPA by
requiring FERC to consider environmental values in licensing decisions.
12. Electric Consumers Protection Act (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-945, 100 Stat. 1243 (codified in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (1994)). Nonpower values include "the purposes of energy
conservation, the protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife
(including related spawning grounds and habitat), the protection of recreational opportunities, and
the preservation of other aspects of environmental quality." 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1994).
13. When the FPA was passed in 1920, it was technologically feasible to transmit electricity over
a distance of only 250 miles. Jerome G. Kerwin, Federal Water-Power Legislation 26 (1926).
Today's modem transmission grid allows long-distance energy transmission. Recently, FERC has
begun taking advantage of this situation to encourage competition in the electricity industry. See
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
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Hydropower does have certain benefits. Many dams can be operated
with conditions designed to minimize their environmental impacts.'4
Considered by some as a "near-perfect" method of energy production,' s
hydropower is promoted as efficient, non-polluting, and renewable.' 6 Most
projects serve other purposes in addition to power production, such as
navigation, flood control, recreation, irrigation, and flow augmentation."
Yet, the environmental impacts of dams are often profound and
extremely difficult to avoid." Dams flood natural stream areas,
disrupting the local ecosystem; cause nutrient-rich silt to build up behind
the dams, depleting oxygen from the water; and block the passage of
adult fish moving upstream and kill young fish moving downstream,
decimating anadromous 9 and other migratory fish runs.2" Thus, although
a source of renewable energy, hydropower consumes another valuable
natural resource: free-flowing rivers and the many ecological,
recreational, aesthetic, and economic benefits that rivers provide.
Recently, there has been a remarkable about-face at FERC, once
known exclusively as a "hydropower promoter."'" In December 1994,
faced with hundreds of expiring licenses, FERC promulgated a Policy
Statement2" asserting that it has the authority to deny a new license at the
time of relicensing or impose environmental conditions on a new license
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting
Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996).
14. Peter J. Kirsch, Maine Dam Decision Reverberates in the West, Denver Post, Jan. 29, 1998, at
B-07 ("Mainstream environmentalists and the hydroelectricity industry agree that dams are the most
environmentally benign and economically viable source of electricity.'); see also River Renewal:
Restoring Rivers Through Hydropower Dam Relicensing (visited Sept. 23, 1998) <http://www.
amrivers.org/rintro.html>.
15. Ben W. Ebenhack, Nontechnical Guide to Energy Resources: Availability, Use and Impact
223 (1995).
16. Id.; see also Donald N. Zillman &Lawrence H. Lattman, Energy Law 549-52 (1983).
17. Zillman & Lattman, supra note 16, at 549-52.
18. See generally Wilson V. Binger et al., Environmental Effects of Large Dams (1978)
(providing collection of scientific studies on environmental impacts of dams); Michael T. Pyle,
Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal as a Strategy for Restoring America's Rivers, 14 Stan. Envtl.
L.J. 97 (1995) (providing broad overview of dam removal issues).
19. Anadromous fishes spend the adult phase of their lives in salt water and return to freshwater
streams and lakes to spawn. Peter B. Moyle & Joseph J. Cech, Jr., Fishes: An Introduction to
Ichthyology 332 (1982).
20. See Dam Facts (visited Sept. 23, 1998) <http://www.amrivers.org/dam.html>. Young
outmigrating fish drawn into the generating turbines are chopped into pieces, thus lending the
nickname "Chowder Alley" to the area downstream of the turbines. Williams, supra note 9, at 38.
21. Echeverria et al., supra note 6, at 8.
22. Project Decommissioning at Relicensing: Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 339 (1995) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. § 2.24 (1997)) [hereinafter Policy Statement].
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that may render a project unprofitable. In addition, FERC stated that it
would impose decommissioning costs on the dam owner.23 In November
1997, FERC exercised its dam decommissioning authority for the first
time when it denied an application for a new license for the Edwards
Dam in Maine and ordered the owners to remove the dam at their own
expense.24 In July 1998, FERC again relied on the Policy Statement, this
time to grant an uneconomic license for the Cushman Project in
Washington State.2
The hydroelectric industry is staunchly opposed to the Policy
Statement.2 6 It claims that FERC lacks the authority under the FPA to
deny a license or impose uneconomic conditions, and that such action
constitutes a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution27 and a breach of contract.28 River conservationists,
however, welcomed the Policy Statement in most respects, and have
argued that FERC possesses broad authority to deny license renewal and
impose decommissioning costs, or grant a license with uneconomic
conditions.29
This Comment analyzes the Federal Power Act to determine whether
FERC has the authority to deny a dam license and impose decom-
missioning costs on the dam owner under the FPA. Part I reviews the
background of the FPA and its key provisions. Part II discusses the
Policy Statement, describing FERC's new interpretation of the FPA. It
also examines the Edwards Dam and Cushman Project relicensing cases
to illustrate FERC's application of the Policy Statement. Part III analyzes
the FPA in light of its legislative history and judicial interpretations of
FERC's authority, and applies the doctrine of navigation servitude to the
question of decommissioning costs. This Comment concludes that FERC
has the statutory authority to deny a license and impose decom-
23. Id. at 346.
24. See Edwards Mfg. Co., 81 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,255 (Nov. 25, 1997)
[hereinafter Edwards Order].
25. See City of Tacoma, Washington, 84 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,107 (July
30, 1998) [hereinafter Cushman Order].
26. See Michael A. Swiger et al., Paying for the Change: Can the FERC Force Dam
Decommissioning at Relicensing?, 17 Energy L.J. 163 (1996).
27. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const.
amend. V.
28. See Swiger et al., supra note 26. Analysis of the takings and breach of contract claims are
outside the scope of this Comment.
29. See Katherine Costenbader, Damning Dams: Bearing the Cost of Restoring America's Rivers,
6 George Mason L. Rev. 635 (1998) (concluding that FERC's decommissioning policy does not
constitute taking); Pyle, supra note 18, at 132-37.
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missioning costs, or to grant a license with uneconomic conditions, when
doing so is necessary to protect the public interest.
I. HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BASES FOR
HYDROPOWER REGULATION
A. Congress's Constitutional Power to Regulate Hydropower
Development
The primary source of Congress's authority to regulate water
resources is rooted in the navigation power implicit in the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.30 In 1824, the Supreme Court confirmed
in Gibbons v. Ogden that:
All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word
"commerce," to comprehend navigation.
The word used in the constitution, then, comprehends, and has
been always understood to comprehend, navigation within its
meaning; and a power to regulate navigation, is as expressly
granted, as if that term had been added to the word "commerce."'
Congress has plenary power over interstate commerce, and because
navigation is commerce, it may protect the navigable capacity of
navigable streams within the United States. 2 This power gives Congress
the authority to prohibit any structure within or over navigable waters or
nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters,33 or permit obstructions that
destroy a stream's navigable capacity.34 Congress's power to give or
withhold consent to place obstructions is entirely discretionary and
encompasses the authority to grant that privilege upon terms and
conditions, and to terminate the privilege once made.3
The FPA is based on the navigation power, under which Congress
may grant a private hydropower developer the privilege of erecting an
30. "The Congress shall have power ... To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian tribes.... U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
31. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) I, 190, 193 (1824).
32. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 708 (1899).
33. River and Harbor Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 403
(1994)); see also Amy K. Kelley, Constitutional Foundations of Federal Water Law, in Water and
Water Rights § 35.02(b) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996).
34. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404-05 (1940).
35. Id. at 426-27; see also Jerome G. Kerwin, Federal Water-Power Legislation 84 (1926).
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obstruction in a waterway under whatever terms, conditions, and limits
Congress chooses.3 6 Congress's intention to invoke fully its constitu-
tional power over navigation in the regulation of hydropower can be seen
in the FPA's broad and expansive definition of "navigable waters."37
Navigability is a question of fact; generally, if a stream can be used
for commerce, it is navigable.38 The navigation power invoked by the
FPA has been interpreted broadly to encompass navigable streams,
streams that once were navigable 39 or could be made so with reasonable
improvements," nonnavigable portions of navigable waterways," and
nonnavigable tributaries that affect the navigable capacity of navigable
waters.42 The navigation power is even broad enough to extend to matters
not directly related to navigation. In United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "[I]t cannot properly
be said that the constitutional power of the United States over its waters
is limited to control for navigation.... In truth the authority of the
United States is the regulation of commerce .... That authority is as
broad as the needs of commerce., 4 3 Thus, although navigation is the
basis of the power, the measure and the limit of the power is not confined
to securing the free passage of the waterways for commerce.'
B. Passage of the Federal Water Power Act
The Federal Water Power Act (FWPA) of 1920"5 was the result of
efforts to bring about a comprehensive water power development scheme
36. Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. at 427.
37. Navigable waters are "those parts of streams or other bodies of water over which Congress
has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce ... and which either in their natural or
improved condition... are used or suitable for use for the transportation of persons or property in
interstate or foreign commerce." 16 U.S.C. § 796(8) (1994).
38. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
39. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 523 (1941).
40. Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. at 407-08.
41. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 709 (1899).
42. United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960). FERC now also has
jurisdiction over projects on nonnavigable waters that affect commerce through interstate
transportation of hydroelectricity. See FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1965).
43. 311 U.S. at 426 (upholding FPA licensing requirements, including conditions unrelated to
navigation, for project on river that was arguably not navigable); see also United States v. Twin City
Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 223-24 (1956) (sanctioning project that provided little or no improvement
to navigation).
44. Eva H. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of
No Compensation, 3 Nat. Res. J. 1, 12 (1963).
45. Supra note 1.
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to replace the piecemeal, restrictive approach of previously enacted
federal laws.4 6 It was the culmination of a lengthy battle between
conservationists, led by President Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford
Pinchot, and a coalition of private hydropower developers and states'
rights advocates.47 Both sides sought to bring about private development
of waterpower, but on vastly different terms. Conservationists wanted
strong federal control over waterpower development to protect the public
interest, while developers sought to minimize federal control.48 Both
groups brought tremendous pressure to bear on Congress, and the
struggle for water power legislation lasted for fifteen years.49
Congress began regulating obstructions to navigation long before
enactment of the FWPA. The first comprehensive legislation on this
matter was the River and Harbor Act of 1884,50 which directed the
Secretary of War to notify Congress of structures placed in navigable
waters that could affect navigation. Sections 9 and 10 of the River and
Harbor Act of 1899 took another step towards federal control by
expressly prohibiting all obstructions to navigation not affirmatively
authorized by Congress." Sections 9 and 10 are virtually unchanged and
remain in effect to the present day.52 Congress passed two other general
dam acts in 1906 and 1910 that attempted to establish a uniform policy
for granting conditional permits via special acts of Congress.53 These
statutes failed to satisfy either conservationists or developers, and did not
bring about large-scale hydropower development.' 4
In 1908, a bill passed pursuant to the 1906 Act instigated a pivotal
moment in the water power debate.55 The bill granted a fourth extension
for completion of waterpower works on the Rainy River in Minnesota.56
46. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 180 (1946).
47. For a detailed history of the events leading up to the Federal Water Power Act, see Kerwin,
supra note 35.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id. at 7-8.
50. Ch. 229, 23 Stat. 133 (1884); see also Jerry L. Mashaw & Richard A. Merill, Introduction to
the American Public Law System 3-101 (1975) (providing case study of river and harbor
legislation).
51. 30 Stat 1121 (1899).
52. 33 U.S.C §§ 401,403 (1994).
53. Kerwin, supra note 35, at 111-14.
54. Id. at 129-30; see also M. Curtis Whittaker, The Federal Power Act and Hydropower
Development: Rediscovering State Regulatory Powers and Responsibilities, 10 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
135, 149 (1986).
55. Kerwin, supra note 35, at 116.
56. Id. at 115.
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President Roosevelt expressed his disagreement with the entire federal
dam scheme with a landmark message that triggered a twelve-year
debate regarding critical water power development issues." In vetoing
the bill, President Roosevelt stated:
The public must retain the control of the great waterways. It is
essential that any permit to obstruct them for reasons and on
conditions that seem good at the moment should be subject to
revision when changed conditions demand.... Provision should be
made for the termination of the grant or privilege at a definite time,
leaving to future generations the power or authority to renew or
extend the concession in accordance with the conditions which may
prevail at that time. 8
In 1920, a water power bill finally passed the House and the Senate. 9
Changes recommended by the House Committee were incorporated into
the bill, and in May 1920 both the House and the Senate approved it.6"
The Federal Water Power Act was signed into law on June 11, 1920.61
C. The Federal Power Act: Mandates and Key Provisions
The FWPA (now FPA)62 was designed to give licensees security in
their investments during the fifty-year license term, while still retaining
in Congress long-term federal control over the utilization of the nation's
water resources for the public interest. At that time, Congress wanted to
ensure that the federal government had the option to take over and
operate projects if necessary to retain federal control over an important
public resource and protect the public from uncontrolled water power
monopolies. 63 Congress has amended the FPA several times since 1920,
57. Whittaker, supra note 54, at 148.
58. H.R. Rep. No. 99-507, at 11-12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496, 2498.
59. Whittaker, supra note 54, at 152.
60. Id.
61. Kerwin, supra note 35, at 260-61.
62. See supra note 1.
63. Vetoing a 1909 water power bill that had no recapture provision, President Roosevelt stated,
"I esteem it my duty to use every endeavor to prevent the growing monopoly, the most threatening
which has ever appeared, from being fastened upon the people of this nation." H.R. Doc. No. 1350
(1909), reprinted in Kerwin, supra note 35, at 123. During a discussion of the federal takeover
provisions, Representative Ferris said, "[T]he Congress should at all times be very careful-yea; be
more than careful-that they do not allow the people to be saddled with a corporation control of this
natural monopoly." 58 Cong. Rec. 1939 (1919) (statement of Rep. Ferris); see also Kerwin, supra
note 35, at 57 ("It is an unquestioned fact that the hydroelectric industry tends toward monopoly.").
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most notably in 1935' and 1986.6 However, the basic plan of the FPA
remains unchanged. It grants the Commission broad authority to
administer the FPA.66 It imposes comprehensive federal regulatory
control over the terms and conditions of private hydropower develop-
ment67 while preserving state water law and water rights68 and giving
licensees considerable security during the license term. 9 Furthermore, it
contains provisions allowing FERC to transfer the project from one
licensee to another at the end of the license term.7" However, it is silent
on the key issue of decommissioning.
The FPA contains a very broad grant of authority to the Commission.
The Commission has power to "perform any and all acts" and to
"prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and
regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions" of the FPA.7' It may impose other conditions that are
consistent with the FPA72 and further the public interest.' In addition,
these conditions may require licensees to conserve and utilize the
navigation and waterpower resources of the region74 or protect life,
health, and property.7" Finally, the FPA expressly incorporates the broad
federal navigation power, making it unlawful to construct, maintain, or
operate any hydroelectric dam project in the navigable waters of the
United States without a valid license.76
Section 6 of the FPA states that licenses may be granted for a period
of fifty years or less.77 The Commission may award licenses to project
proposals "best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or
64. Public Utility Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79z-6 &
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (1994)).
65. Electric Consumers Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986) (codified in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (1994)).
66. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
67. See First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 180-81 (1945).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1994).
69. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
70. 16 U.S.C. §§ 807-808 (1994).
71. 16 U.S.C. § 825h (1994).
72. 16 U.S.C. § 803(g) (1994).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 797(g) (1994).
74. 16 U.S.C. § 797(g).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 803(c) (1994).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 817(1) (1994); see also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
77. 16 U.S.C.A. § 799 (West Supp. 1998).
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developing a waterway."78 The controlling standard is whether a
particular project will be in the public interest.79 In Udall v. Federal
Power Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court broadly defined this public
interest test to include factors such as future power supply and demand,
alternate power sources, preservation of wild rivers and wilderness areas,
preservation of anadromous fish runs, and protection of wildlife."
In 1986, having found that FERC had failed to give nonpower
interests sufficient weight in its licensing decisions,8 Congress amended
the FPA by passing the Electric Consumers Protection Act (ECPA).82
The ECPA contains several new requirements designed to provide
greater environmental protections. First, it strengthens the public interest
standard by explicitly forcing FERC, when deciding whether to issue a
license, to give "equal consideration" to power and nonpower values
such as fish and wildlife preservation, mitigation, and enhancement;
recreation opportunities; energy conservation; and the preservation of
other aspects of environmental quality.8 3 Second, it requires the
Commission to consider the recommendations of Indian tribes affected
by the project, as well as those of federal or state agencies exercising
administration over project-impacted resources.84 Third, it obligates the
Commission to include license conditions based on the recommendations
of federal and state resource agencies for protection, mitigation and
enhancement of fish and wildlife." Fourth, it mandates that licensees
accept all terms and conditions of the FPA, along with any additional
conditions that the Commission may impose.86
The FPA grants licensees considerable security during the fifty-year
license term,87 giving them enough time to realize a profit from their
investment.88 Congress expressly reserved the right to alter, amend, or
repeal the FPA, but provided that such changes would not affect
78. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (1994).
79. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428,450 (1967).
80. Id.
81. H.R. Rep. No. 99-507, at 17 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496, 2503-04.
82. Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (1994)).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1994).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(2)(B) (1994).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 803()(1) (1994).
86. 16 U.S.C.A. § 799 (West Supp. 1998).
87. 16 U.S.C.A. § 799.
88. However, the FPA does not guarantee that a project will be profitable. Wisconsin Pub. Serv.
Corp. v. FERC, 32 F.3d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994).
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currently valid licenses or licensees' rights.89 However, after a license
expires, FERC subjects renewal applications to the same rigorous public
interest review as original licenses and may impose whatever new
conditions it finds are required to meet the standards of the FPA, FERC
regulations, and other laws in effect at that time.
90
Sections 14 and 15 address license transfer and relicensing procedures.
License transfer options include federal takeover, granting a new license
to the original licensee, or transferring the project to a new licensee.
Section 14 provides that at the end of the license term, the United States
has the right to "take over and thereafter to maintain and operate" any
project upon payment of "net investment"' 9 plus "severance damages,"'
if any, to compensate for the owner's investment in the electricity
generating equipment.93 The government may also take over, maintain,
and operate a licensed project during the license period by condemnation
proceedings upon payment of just compensation.94 This arrangement
preserves the licensee's security in its investment over the fifty-year
license term by requiring a significantly higher price tag for federal
takeover during the term than after the license expires.
If the federal government does not take over a project, section 15
authorizes the Commission to issue a new license to the original licensee,
or to a new licensee.95 A new licensee takes over the project on the same
terms as the government would by paying net investment and severance
costs to the former licensee. 96 The Commission may issue a new license
to the applicant having the final proposal "best adapted to serve the
89. 16 U.S.C. § 822 (1994).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 808(a) (1994).
91. "Net investment" is the original cost of the project, plus the cost of subsequent improvements,
minus total accumulated depreciation. 16 U.S.C. § 808(a); Echeverria et al., supra note 6, at 74. Net
investment specifically excludes good will, going value, and prospective revenues. 16 U.S.C.
§ 807(a) (1994). At the end of a 50-year license term this amount is typically very low. Echeverria
et al., supra note 6, at 74; see also H.R Rep. No. 99-507, at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496, 2501 ("By the time a license comes up for renewal, the project has been
operating for thirty to fifty years and is substantially, if not fully, depreciated.").
92. The term "severance" in this context literally means severing one piece of equipment from the
whole and is not to be confused with severance damages paid for contracts. See In re Pacific Power
& Light, 23 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CC-) 63,037 (FERC Apr. 28, 1983). Severance
damages are likely to be very small. Echeverria, supra note 6, at 74.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 807(a).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 807(a).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1).
96. 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1).
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public interest."97 The Commission may choose to grant a temporary
"nonpower use" license if it determines that a project should no longer be
used for hydropower generation."8 A nonpower license is temporary and
terminates when a governmental agency agrees to take over jurisdiction
of the project.99 There has never been a federal takeover of a project, nor
has a nonpower license ever been issued."°
Section 15 also contains a measure designed to allow hydroelectric
facilities to remain in operation in case there is a delay in determining
license disposition.'' It provides that upon license expiration, a licensee
receives an annual license on the same terms as the original license until
a new license is issued or the property is taken over.0 2
The FPA is silent on the question of decommissioning. It does not
specify what should happen when a dam is so uneconomical, obsolete, or
environmentally damaging that FERC finds it impossible to issue a
license that will comport with the broad public interest standards
mandated by the FPA. Because the FPA fails to address decommis-
sioning, it also does not specify who should incur the decommissioning
costs of a hydroelectric project. When the FWPA was passed in 1920, the
focus was on hydroelectric development. Congress planned for the
possibility that the federal government might want to own and operate
certain projects" or pass them to a more responsible licensee."° They
even foresaw a need to impose new conditions at the end of the license
term. '5 But no serious consideration was given to the possibility that a
free-flowing river might someday become more valuable than the
hydropower a dam produced."0 6
97. 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(2) (1994).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 808(f) (1994). Examples of nonpower uses include recreation and water supply.
H.R. Rep. No. 1643, at 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3081.
99. 16 U.S.C. § 808(f).
100. Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 341.
101. "Congress fashioned Section 15 to prevent abrupt termination of a power project which
should, in the public interest, be continued but with respect to which the identity of the operator and
the exact method of operation must be reevaluated." Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. FPC, 510 F.2d 198,
205-06 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1) (1994).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1994).
104. 16 U.S.C. § 808(a).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 808(a). ("[The Commission is authorized to issue a new license to the existing
licensee upon such terms and conditions as may be authorized or required under the then existing
laws and regulations....").
106. During the water power legislation debates, dam removal was rarely mentioned, and even then
summarily dismissed without further discussion. See, e.g., 59 Cong. Rec. 1474 (1920) (statement of
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II. FERC'S NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE FPA: THE POLICY
STATEMENT AND ITS APPLICATIONS
A. The Decommissioning Policy Statement
In 1993, faced with 173 expiring licenses"7 and many more scheduled
to expire in the coming decade, FERC issued a Notice of Inquiry (NOI)
to solicit comments from interested parties regarding the issue of dam
decommissioning."' 8 The NOI featured fifteen questions on a range of
decommissioning topics including the scope of FERC's decommis-
sioning authority, various approaches to decommissioning in the context
of relicensing, and planning and funding options for decommissioning.
After considering comments from the hydroelectric industry, agencies,
tribes, and environmental groups, FERC issued its Policy Statement on
December 14, 1994.'09
In the Policy Statement, FERC interpreted the FPA in light of its
legislative history and broad public interest standard and concluded that:
[FERC] has the legal authority to deny a new license at the time of
relicensing if it determines that, even with ample use of its
conditioning authority, no license can be fashioned that will
comport with the statutory standard under section 10(a) of the
Federal Power Act (the Act) and other applicable law."0
Normally, the balance between power and environmental interests
required under the FPA can be accommodated through the imposition of
licensing conditions designed to mitigate environmental harms caused by
Sen. Walsh) (raising possibility that federal government might order removal of dam from navigable
stream, Senator Walsh answered his own question by stating, "But, of course, it is unthinkable that
the Government would do anything of that kind, and constantly we must dismiss that").
107. Clarke, supra note 2, at 9.
108. 58 Fed. Reg. 48,991 (1993).
109. Policy Statement, supra note 22.
110. Id. at 340. Section 10(a) of the FPA provides:
That the project adopted.., shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be best
adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the
use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-
power development, for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), and for other beneficial public uses,
including irrigation, flood control, water supply, and recreational and other purposes.
16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1994).
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the dam."' FERC stated that license denial will rarely occur because it
will only deny a license when it is impossible to create a license
consistent with the FPA." 2 Therefore, the more likely scenario for
economically marginal projects with severe environmental impacts is
that FERC will issue a new license, but impose conditions that render the
project uneconomical, thereby leading the licensee to reject the license."'
In either case, according to FERC, the project will need to be
decommissioned."14
FERC concluded that it has the authority to oversee the decommis-
sioning process to "satisfactorily protect the public interests involved."
'"15
FERC found various practical reasons for retaining jurisdiction over
decommissioning, citing its past experience with voluntary decommis-
sioning settlements and the need to avoid a piecemeal approach."6 FERC
indicated that it would take a flexible approach to decommissioning." 7
The Policy Statement encourages settlement through negotiation among
interested parties," 8 but maintains that FERC has the statutory authority
to take action if a negotiated settlement cannot be reached. " 9
The Policy Statement placed the responsibility for funding
decommissioning on the licensee rather than the federal taxpayer, "since
the licensee created the project and benefited from its operations."'2 ° The
Commission's primary concern was to ensure that funds are available to
accomplish whatever level of decommissioning the Commission requires
so that the taxpayer will not, by default, be forced to pay if the licensee
11. Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 342. Examples include controls on the amount and timing
of flow releases below a dam, installation of fish ladders, or improved recreational access.
Echeverria et al., supra note 6, at 67.
112. Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 340.
113. Id.
114. The Policy Statement defined "decommissioning" very broadly to encompass all decom-
missioning options from simply shutting down the power operations to tearing out the dam and
restoring the site to pre-project conditions. Id.
115. Id. at 344.
116. Id. at 344-45.
117. Id. at 345.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 340.
120. Id. at 346. The Commission did concede that there may be "some situations" in which it
would be best to recommend federal takeover or to work out "some kind of cost-sharing
arrangement" if the costs became "unreasonable." Id. Unfortunately, the Policy Statement did not




cannot.'2' FERC contemplated three possible mechanisms for funding
decommissioning." FERC chose to look at particular facts on the record
in a given relicensing case and to impose license conditions requiring a
project-specific decommissioning trust fund should the Commission find
that decommissioning is likely within the next thirty years, or that the
licensee lacks the financial resources to meet future decommissioning
costs without a trust fund.' FERC apparently adopted this option
because it allows individual licensees to avoid the decommissioning
funding issue entirely until decommissioning becomes a foreseeable
reality. 24 Although FERC claims that it has the statutory authority under
the FPA to deny licenses and impose decommissioning costs, the Policy
Statement fails to address the hydroelectricity industry's claim that such
actions constitute a regulatory taking and a breach of contract."z
B. Applying the Policy Statement to Deny a License and Impose Costs:
The Edwards Dam
For three years, FERC did not apply the Policy Statement. This
changed on November 25, 1997, when FERC denied a license and
ordered the decommissioning of the Edwards Project located on the
Kennebec River in Augusta, Maine.'26 The Edwards Project site has been
dammed since 1837, and hydroelectric facilities have been in place since
1913.27 FERC licensed the project in 1964.2 The Edwards Project
produces only one-tenth of one percent of Maine's total electricity
121. Id.
122. Id. at 346-47. FERC considered two other options. One option was to impose generically a
decommissioning fund requirement on each licensee. FERC rejected this option because it would
have forced licensees to tie up funds in suboptimal investments for an uncertain and possibly distant
time in the future. Id The second option was to establish a nationwide decommissioning fund,
financed by annual charges imposed by the Commission. FERC rejected this option, claiming that
there was no evidence that such a fund was needed at the time, but suggested that it might become
appropriate in the future. Id. Some commentators have argued that FERC should establish a
nationwide dam decommissioning fund now, so that dam owners will be able to internalize the costs
of decommissioning and ensure that funds will always be available. See Costenbader, supra note 29,
at 663-72.
123. Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 346-47.
124. Id.
125. See Costenbader, supra note 29 (discussing taking and breach of contract issues); Swiger
et al., supra note 26 (same).
126. Edwards Order, supra note 24.
127. Id. at 62,199.
128. Id.
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supply 2 9 Central Maine Power purchased the electricity by contract for
a price five times above market rate.
30
The Kennebec once supported runs of every anadromous fish species
native to the northeastern United States, 3 ' but this rich fishery was
abruptly cut off when Edwards Dam was built without any fishways
32
Fish passage facilities were installed in 1880 but proved ineffective.'
33
The Kennebec River supports numerous hydropower projects along its
132 mile length, but Edwards is the first barrier encountered by sea-run
fish entering the river from the Atlantic Ocean. Removing the dam would
create a sixty-mile uninterrupted stretch of river extending to the Atlantic
Ocean.
134
In 1991, Edwards filed a relicensing application with FERC. The
application proposed to expand the project's electricity generation
capability and to mitigate damages by providing limited fish passage and
recreation facilities. 3 The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the
relicensing analyzed four basic options, ranging from granting a new
license as proposed by the licensees to denying a license and ordering
dam removal.1
36
The EIS concluded that even the best available fish passage facilities
would fail to restore the entire fishery, and that only dam removal would
restore the river environment that is the preferred spawning habitat of
many of these fish species. 37 FERC also found that dam removal would
dramatically enhance sport and commercial fishing opportunities,
resulting in substantial regional economic benefits, and create stretches
of rapids suitable for various types of recreational boating. 38 Thus, the
Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) recommended the dam
removal alternative.
139
129. This amount of electricity could be saved by replacing only 75,000 regular light bulbs with
energy efficient ones. Kennebec Coalition, Restoring Maine's Kennebec River: The Edwards Dam
Relicensing 2 (1998) (on file with author).
130. The contract expired in 1998. Id. at 3.
131. Edwards Order, supra note 24, at 62,202. These include alewives, American shad, Atlantic
salmon, striped bass, rainbow smelt, Atlantic sturgeon, and shortuose sturgeon. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 62,204.
135. Id. at 62,200.
136. Id. at 62,205.
137. Id. at 62,203.
138. Id. at 62,204.
139. Id. at 62,201.
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FERC also performed an economic analysis of the project, finding that
Edwards power would cost more than the current cost of alternative
power, even under the licensee's proposal. 4 Furthermore, imposing
conditions on relicensing as analyzed by FERC staff would render the
project uneconomic to the licensee, while at the same time failing to
mitigate the project's severe environmental damage. 4 '
FERC concluded that it would be impossible to create a new license
for Edwards Dam that would comport with the FPA's public interest
mandate.'42 An independent analysis estimated the cost of dam removal
at $2.7 million, 43 and the EIS estimated the cost of imposing
recommended conditions at $10 million.'" At best, imposition of costly
yet necessary conditions would only partially mitigate damages, while
rendering the dam uneconomic-all for the sake of producing power that
could be replaced more cheaply from other sources in the region. Thus,
FERC denied the license and ordered Edwards to come up with a plan
for financing and carrying out decommissioning.
45
For some time, the fate of Edwards Dam remained unclear. The
licensee vowed to fight the decommissioning order in court should FERC
decide not to stay the order.146 To forestall a lengthy court battle, the
licensee entered into negotiations with the State and other interested
parties in an attempt to reach a settlement.47 On May 26, 1998, the
parties announced a voluntary settlement agreement, thus preventing the
Edwards case and the Policy Statement from being tested in court.
48
Under the agreement, the dam would be transferred from its current
owners to the State of Maine on January 1, 1999, and the State would
launch a significant fisheries recovery program at that time. 49 Contingent
140. Id. at 62,207.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 62,210.
143. Id. at 62,207.
144. Office of Hydropower Licensing, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, FERC/FEIS No. 0097, Final
Environmental Impact Statement, at xxvi (1997).
145. Edwards Order, supra note 24, at 62,211. Commissioner Bailey dissented. Id. at 62,211-12.
146. Ellen Jovin, Edwards Dam: A Watershed Decisionfor Hydropower, Elec. world, Mar. 1998,
at 44, available in LEXIS, NEWS Folder, CURNWS File.
147. King Pitches Dam Plan to City, Portland Press Herald, Apr. 15, 1998, at 8B, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Folder, CURNWS File.
148. Contentious Edwards Dam Case Comes to a Close, Energy Daily, May 29, 1998, available
in LEXIS, NEWS Folder, CURNWS File [hereinafter Contentious Edwards Dam Case].
149. Historic Agreement Reached to Remove Edwards Dam, U.S. Newswire, May 26, 1998,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Folder, CURNWS File [hereinafter Historic Agreement].
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on government approval, Edwards Dam will be dismantled between May
and September 1999.15
Funding for both dam removal and fishery restoration will come
entirely from private sources, including $2.5 million from Bath Iron
Works, a shipbuilder, and $4.75 million from the Kennebec Hydro
Developers Group, a coalition of dam operators upstream of the Edwards
Dam.' In return, Bath Iron Works will receive environmental mitigation
credit allowing it to expand its shipyard by fifteen acres, and the
upstream dam operators may defer fish passage requirements for their
dams. 12 Neither the owners of Edwards Dam nor the taxpayers will have
to pay for the dam removal and fishery restoration.'53
C. Applying the Policy Statement by Granting a License with
Uneconomic Conditions: The Cushman Project
On July 30, 1998, FERC granted a new license to the city of Tacoma,
Washington's 131-megawatt Cushman Project by a four-one vote."' The
Cushman Project was first licensed in 1924.' It consists of two dams,
two powerhouses, and associated facilities on the North Fork of the
Skokomish River. 5 6 The Cushman Project had been operating under
annual licenses since 1974.' A final FERC order was delayed for two
decades by a series of complex legal disputes regarding relicensing.'58
Because water is diverted from the river to a powerhouse located out of
the basin and is not returned to the river downstream,'59 much of the
150. Id.
151. Contentious Edwards Dam Case, supra note 148.
152. Maine Dam Is Coming Down, Elec. Daily, May 27, 1998, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Folder, CURNWS File.
153. Historic Agreement, supra note 149.
154. Cushman Order, supra note 25, at 61,535. Commissioner Bailey dissented. Id. at 61,602-03.
155. Id. at 61,535. The original license was for a minor project that Tacoma later expanded
significantly. FERC then determined that Tacoma should obtain a license for the entire project, and
Tacoma filed an application to do so at relicensing. Id. The validity of the original license has been
called into question. See F. Lorraine Bodi & Robert J. Masonis, Letter to the Editor, News Trib.
(Tacoma, Wash.), Jan. 28, 1998 at C5.
156. Cushman Order, supra note 25, at 61,536.
157. Id.
158. FERC Addresses Long-Standing Hydro Disputes in Nebraska and Washington with Possible
Implications for Future Policy, Foster Elec. Rep., Rep. No. 145, Aug. 5, 1998, at 2, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Folder, CURNWS File [hereinafter FERC Addresses Hydro Disputes].
159. Cushman Order, supra note 25, at 61,536. The project completely dewatered the river from
1930 to 1988 and since 1988 only 30 cfs (cubic feet per second) have passed the project dams
(compared to a pre-project flow of 750 cfs). Bodi & Masonis, supra note 155.
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controversy surrounds the extent of the diversion of water and the
appropriate level of water required to restore salmon and other fish
species to the river.1"°
FERC had three alternatives for relicensing the project. Tacoma
proposed to continue operating the project largely as it had in the past,
with some environmental improvements including a minimum instream
flow of 100 cubic feet per second (cfs).'' The second alternative, a
FERC staff adaptation of proposals presented by federal and state
agencies, the Skokomish Indian Tribe, and environmental groups, would
cease all out-of-basin diversions except for flood control, create
extensive fish habitat enhancements and a new hatchery, and require
protection and enhancement of nearly 16,000 acres of wildlife habitat.' 62
A third option, offered as a compromise by FERC staff, required a
minimum flow of 240 cfs and nearly 6,000 acres of wildlife habitat
enhancement, among other environmental improvements. 6
FERC chose a modified version of the third proposal, seeking a
middle ground between the desires of the utility, the tribe, agencies, and
environmental interests." 'he order establishes a minimum flow of 240
cfs, mandates land acquisition for habitat protection, and creates a 50- to
200-yard buffer along the river below the dam. 6 It also requires fish
passage facilities, a fish hatchery, and a fish stocking program.
66
Although FERC's chosen alternative represents a compromise, FERC
noted that the imposed license conditions would still result in a first year
operational loss of $2.5 million.67 For this reason, Tacoma argued that
these recommended license conditions would bankrupt the project and
force Tacoma to decommission it.' 68 FERC relied on the Policy
Statement to explain that it has the authority to issue a new license
subject to conditions that make the cost of project power greater than
160. Cushman Order, supra note 25, at 61,536.
161. Id. at 61,540.
162. Id. at 61,541.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 61,541-42.
165. FERC's Approval of Cushman License Spurs Opposition from Area Utility and Tribe,
Energy Report, Aug. 3, 1998, available in LEXIS, NEWS Folder, CURNWS File [hereinafter
FERC's Approval of Cushman License].
166. FERC Addresses Hydro Disputes, supra note 158.
167. Cushman Order, supra note 25, at 61,570. The project would produce an average annual
power value of $6.39 million at an annual cost of about $8.87 million. Id.
168. Id. at 61,570-71.
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available alternatives, and that such action does not constitute a taking.'69
FERC noted that if Tacoma chose not to accept the license, and no other
resolution of the issue presented itself, then Tacoma must surrender the
license.'70
Tacoma indicated that it would request a rehearing of the Cushman
Order and appeal to federal court if necessary.' 7 ' On September 29, 1998,
FERC granted rehearing of the order for the limited purpose of further
consideration. 72 The Cushman Order could prove to be even more
controversial than the Edwards Order because the Cushman Project is
much larger and, although FERC did not expressly order decommis-
sioning, Tacoma claims that the Order forces it either to decommission
or operate at a loss. 73
III. ANALYSIS OF FERC'S DECOMMISSIONING AUTHORITY
In the Policy Statement, FERC made clear that it wants parties to
make use of creative, voluntary settlement agreements to resolve
relicensing issues, but that it retains the power to force dam
decommissioning if necessary. 74 FERC may have calculated that the
Policy Statement could serve as an effective way to force the parties to
the negotiating table, thereby encouraging a mutually beneficial
settlement and allowing them to avoid the prospect of a long and costly
litigation process with an uncertain outcome. In the Edwards case, this is
precisely what occurred.'75 The hydroelectric industry still disagrees with
the Policy Statement, however, and it will likely be tested in court,
perhaps in the Cushman case.'76
FERC asserts that it may deny a license and impose decommissioning
costs or grant an unprofitable license when it finds that decommissioning
169. Id. at 61,571.
170. Id. at 61,572.
171. FERC's Approval of Cushman License, supra note 165, at 2.
172. Order Granting Late Intervention and Granting Rehearing for Further Consideration, 84
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,317 (FERC Sept. 29, 1998). Several hydroelectricity
industry associations requested rehearing of legal and policy issues concerning FERC's authority
pursuant to the Policy Statement. Id.
173. Cushman Dam Relicensing Order Roils Hydro Industry, Energy Daily, July 31, 1998, at 2,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Folder, CURNWS File.
174. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part H.B.
176. Contentious Edwards Dam Case, supra note 148.
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is in the public interest.' The hydroelectric industry asserts that the FPA
should be read narrowly to limit FERC's options upon license expiration
to those expressly enumerated in the FPA. 78 Under this reading, when a
license expires, the licensee would be entitled to annual licenses forever
unless it receives a new license, a license is issued to a new licensee, or
there is a federal takeover.'79 Moreover, the industry takes the position
that if a license is granted, its conditions must not be so onerous as to
render the project uneconomic. 8 ° However, the FPA, the legislative
history of the Act, and judicial interpretations of the FPA do not support
the industry's view. Rather, they support the conclusion that FERC
properly issued the Policy Statement to fill gaps in the FPA left by
Congress's failure to address directly the decommissioning problem.
A. FERC Has Decommissioning Authority Under the Federal Power
Act to Protect the Public Interest
1. The FPA Is Silent on Project Decommissioning
The hydroelectric industry is striving to avoid responsibility for
decommissioning by claiming that if a project is no longer in the public
interest, the federal government must take over the project under section
14 and then decommission it at the taxpayer's expense.'8 ' The industry
also claims that section 15 bars FERC from denying a license because it
mandates that licensees receive annual licenses indefinitely unless the
project is taken over or a new license is issued to the licensee.'
However, analyzing the FPA as a whole in light of the legislative history
and conditions existing at the time of its passage indicates that Congress
did not contemplate the need to decommission hydroelectric projects.
The FPA is therefore silent on this issue.
Conditions were considerably different when Congress passed the
FPA nearly eighty years ago. Many feared that communities that grew up
around the dam sites and were totally dependent on the power would
177. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
178. See Swiger et al., supra note 26, at 164-66.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 166.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 165.
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suffer terribly if the project were to cease power production. 83 At that
time, power could not be transmitted more than 250 miles from the dam
site;"8 thus, obtaining power from a distant site was not an option. For
this reason, Congress put provisions in the FPA designed to ensure that
projects would continue to operate, even if at license expiration a
licensee rejected the new license and threatened to abandon the
project.
185
The purpose of the section 14 takeover provision is to allow the
federal government to "take over, maintain and operate'' 86 projects in
order to retain federal control over a public resource and prevent
monopoly.'87 Section 14 presupposes that the continued existence and
operation of the project is in the public interest, and that the federal
government should control the project. Federal takeover makes sense
when the project should be operated for power or maintained for other
public benefits such as flood control. The provision simply does not
contemplate a situation where the very existence of the project is not in
the public interest and the only purpose of the takeover would be to foist
the costs of decommissioning onto the taxpayers.'88
To protect further power-dependent communities, Congress provided
in section 15 for issuance of annual licenses as an interim measure if the
Commission failed to resolve license disposition by the time the license
expired.8 9 Although Congress wanted to protect these communities by
183. The debates suggest that the FPA is silent on decommissioning because nobody could
contemplate a future in which one of these dams would no longer be in the public interest. Senator
Walsh speculated that the only thing that might interrupt the issuance of annual licenses would be if
the Government decided to destroy the dam because it was an obstruction to navigation, but then
went on to say that "of course, it is unthinkable that the Government would do anything of that kind,
and constantly we must dismiss that." 59 Cong. Rec. 1474 (1920) (statement of Sen. Walsh).
184. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
185. Will the great communities that have been built up, will the populous cities that get their
light from these power plants, go in darkness? Will street railways getting their power from the
power plant stop running? Will the mills and factories that supply the population of great cities
with labor supplied with power from the power plant go idle? Why, Mr. President, it is
unthinkable.
59 Cong. Rec. 1442 (1920) (statement of Sen. Walsh); see also supra notes 91-100 and accompan-
ying text.
186. 16 U.S.C. § 807(a) (1994).
187. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
188. For the same reason, a nonpower license would also be inappropriate in this situation
because it presupposes that the continued existence of the project is in the public interest. See supra
notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 10 1-02 and accompanying text. Senator Nelson commented that "[i]t seems
to me that that is wiser than to have the use of the power entirely lapse. It is the theory of that
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ensuring that projects would continue to operate, it did not intend for
annual licenses to transform the fifty-year license into a de facto
perpetual license.19
Similarly, section 15 does not bar FERC from denying a license. The
fifty-year limit on licenses is a cornerstone of the FPA-one that
President Roosevelt considered non-negotiable and that Congress readily
incorporated into the FWPA.191 Furthermore, section 15 requires that
new licenses be issued "upon such terms and conditions as may be
authorized or required under the then existing laws and regulations,"' 92
which strongly suggests that Congress did not intend for annual licenses
based on fifty-year old laws and regulations to extend into perpetuity. To
allow licensees to receive annual licenses forever when the project
should cease to operate would be an absurd interpretation of the FPA that
flies in the face of the fifty-year license limit.93 Because there is a
judicial presumption against imputing to Congress an intent to produce
an absurd, unintended result,% '94 section 15 does not support the
hydroelectric industry's contention that FERC cannot refuse to issue a
new license and order decommissioning.
Thus, Congress did not contemplate the need for decommissioning,
and the FPA is silent on this important point. The FPA as written
contains a built-in assumption that the continued operation of the projects
would always be necessary and in the public interest. Sections 14 and 15
provision, undoubtedly, that instead of having the use of the water power remain idle or abandoned it
shall be extended from year to year." 59 Cong. Rec. 1441 (1920) (statement of Sen. Nelson). Senator
Fletcher likewise stated:
[T]he obligation of the Congress, it seems to me, is to put this great industry in such position
that the public will get benefit from it and that it can not be paralyzed and dissipated merely
because the Govemment, through its officials, fails to do that which it should do. We want to
say in the bill that the commission must act, not that they may sit idle and let time go by and pay
no attention to these great enterprises all over the country. They must do something.
59 Cong. Rec. 1044 (1920) (statement of Sen. Fletcher).
190. The debate centered around the wording of section 6. Some senators feared it could allow the
licensee to reject a new license unless its terms were more favorable than the original one, and then
just continue operating under the annual licenses forever, thus creating a perpetual license. 59 Cong.
Rec. 1042-49 (1920).
191. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
192. 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1) (1994).
193. Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. FPC, 510 F.2d 198, 209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[I]f Congress
decides against federal recapture, then continued operation of Section 15 would indeed serve no
rational purpose if a new license cannot issue.").
194. See, e.g., Red River Broad. Co. v. FCC, 98 F.2d 282, 286-87 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (finding that
construction of Communications Act and FCC rules as allowing appellant to avoid exhaustion of
administrative remedies is absurd).
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were designed for this scenario. Today, the concerns that gave rise to the
assumption that hydropower dams would always be in the public interest
are no longer valid. Cities will not come grinding to a halt if the local
dam is decommissioned. Power can now be transmitted efficiently across
large areas, and cheaper sources of power are often available from
outside the dam area.'95 As the hydroelectricity industry faces
deregulation, marginal dams may be rendered uneconomic and may be
abandoned."' New concerns have arisen, such as the steep decline in
anadromous fish stocks.'97 Thus, current circumstances demonstrate the
need for a comprehensive decommissioning policy. With the Policy
Statement, FERC appropriately stepped in to address this important need.
2. The Policy Statement Is a Reasonable Exercise of FERC's
Broad Authority
The FPA contains several broad, general grants of authority that
empower FERC to fill regulatory gaps in the statute. 9 8 The FPA states
that FERC may issue "orders, rules and regulations as it may find
necessary and appropriate," '99 such as the Policy Statement, to "conserve
and utilize the navigation and water-power resources of the region."200 In
addition, the general grant of authority in section 10 of the FPA enables
FERC to make licensees subject to "such other conditions not inconsistent
with the provisions of [the FPA] as the Commission may require.
201
Furthermore, it is well established that an administrative agency with
a broad statutory mandate has the authority to take discretionary actions
to fulfill its duties.202 Federal courts interpret the Commission's authority
under the FPA broadly. The U.S. Supreme Court declared that under
sections 4(e)203 and 1 0(a)214 of the FPA, "the Commission is plainly made
195. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. This situation is exemplified by the Edwards Dam
scenario.
196. See Run-of-the-River, Hydropower Reform Coalition Annual Report, Sept. 1997, Electric
Utility Restructuring: What Does It Mean for Hydropower? (visited Sept. 23, 1998) <http://www.
amrivers.org/runriver.html>.
197. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
199. 16 U.S.C. § 825(h) (1994).
200. 16 U.S.C. § 797(g) (1994).
201. 16 U.S.C. § 803(g) (1994).
202. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ("The power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation of
policy and the making of rules to fill any gaps left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.").
203. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1994).
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the guardian of the public domain."2 °5 The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals has declared that the FPA is not to be given a tight
reading wherein every action of the Commission is justified only if
referable to express statutory authorization.0 6 On the contrary, the Act is
one that entrusts a broad subject-matter to administration by the
Commission, subject to Congressional oversight, in the light of new and
evolving problems and doctrines.20 7
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that the FPA "should
receive a practical construction,-one enabling the Commission to
perform facilely the duties required of it by Congress."2 ° It noted that
"[i]f the Commission is intelligently to exercise its extensive regulatory
and supervisory power, it must have been intended that it shall have
power to do everything essential to the execution of its clearly granted
powers and the achievement of the purposes of the legislation."2" The
Third Circuit, recognizing that "[t]o put it bluntly, there are hiatuses and
inconsistencies in the Federal Power Act,"2'10 has also noted the need for
FERC to move beyond the text of the FPA to effectuate the purposes it
was intended to serve. The Second Circuit has held that the
Commission's role in protecting the public interest "does not permit it to
act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries
appearing before it; the right of the public must receive active and
affirmative protection at the hands of the Commission."2"'
The fundamental mandate of the FPA is utilization of the nation's
waterways in a manner consistent with the public interest.2' 2 Inherent in
FERC's ability to issue licenses of limited duration is its ability to deny a
license that would not be consistent with the public interest or to impose
whatever conditions it views as necessary to meet the public interest. The
FPA mandates that FERC follow set criteria in deciding whether a
license meets the broad public interest standard.2"3 The U.S. Supreme
204. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1994).
205. FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17,23 (1952).
206. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
207. Id.
208. Northern States Power Co. v. FPC, 118 F.2d 141, 144 (7th Cir. 1941).
209. Id. at 143. But see South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 850 F.2d 788, 793 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (holding that FERC cannot displace state tort law pursuant to its authority to protect life,
health, and property).
210. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. FPC, 169 F.2d 719,723 (3d Cir. 1948).
211. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965).
212. See supra notes 8,79-86 and accompanying text.
213. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1994).
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Court held that "[t]he test is whether the project will be in the public
interest. And that determination can be made only after an exploration of
all issues relevant to the 'public interest,' including... the preservation
of anadromous fish for commercial and recreational purposes. ' 14
This requirement was strengthened by ECPA, which explicitly
requires FERC to accord equal weight to nonpower values.215 Indeed, the
legislative history of ECPA indicates that Congress anticipated the
possibility that FERC might have to exercise its authority to order dam
removal: "If State or Federal fish and wildlife agencies report that a
project's impacts... cannot be mitigated, FERC may have to conclude
that issuance of the license, whether original or otherwise, may be
inappropriate. ... '216
FERC may refuse to grant an original license that fails to meet public
interest standards. 17 The purpose of the fifty-year limit on licenses is to
provide an opportunity to reevaluate periodically hydropower projects to
determine whether they still serve the public interest.218 The scrutiny
given to relicensing applications is the same as that given to original
license applications.219 Thus, a consistent interpretation of the FPA
requires that FERC also decline to relicense projects that fail those same
standards.
In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that when a statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute., 220 The court will
214. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967); see also LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389, 402
(9th Cir. 1988) (suspending hydroelectric dam license until NEPA requirements are met); Friends of
the River v. FERC, 720 F.2d 93, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding inadequacies in environmental
impact statement, but declining to set aside dam license).
215. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
216. H.R. Rep. No. 99-507, at 32 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496, 2519. A House
Conference Report also stated:
Projects licensed years earlier must undergo the scrutiny of today's values as provided in this
law and other environmental laws applicable to such projects. If nonpower values cannot be
adequately protected, FERC should exercise its authority to restrict or, particularly in the case of
original licenses, even deny a license on a waterway.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-934, at 22 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2537, 2538.
217. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-934 at 22, repinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2537, 2538.
218. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
219. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466, 470 (9th
Cir. 1984) ("Congress intended the Commission to make the same inquiries on relicensing as on
initial licensing."); see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
220. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
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defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute if it is reasonable.221
Accordingly, the issue is whether FERC's Decommissioning Policy
Statement is a reasonable interpretation of the FPA.
FERC, faced with dozens of expiring licenses, realized that
decommissioning would certainly be a recurring problem in the future.
The Policy Statement reasonably fills this gap in the statute by
recognizing that when a dam no longer serves the public interest and
therefore it is impossible for FERC to create a license that meets FPA
standards, decommissioning should occur. It also affirms FERC's
authority to grant a license including any conditions necessary to protect
the public interest.
B. FERC Has Authority to Impose Decommissioning Costs
In addition to possessing the statutory authority to deny a license,
FERC may, through its broad discretionary powers to implement the
222FPA, impose decommissioning costs on licensees in a reasonable
manner. The FPA is based on Congress's navigation power.' The
navigation servitude,224 or "rule of no compensation," is a corollary to the
navigation power. The navigation servitude establishes that, in its
exercise of the navigation power, Congress may take private property
without compensation.' The navigation power differs from all other
federal regulatory powers in this regard; Congress may, in exercising the
navigation power, destroy private rights for which it would otherwise
have to pay just compensation if it destroyed the same rights under a
different power.226 Property is not "taken" because the navigation
servitude is "a power to which the interests of riparian owners have
always been subject."227
221. Id.
222. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
224. For discussions of navigation servitude, see Richard W. Bartke, The Navigation Servitude
and Just Compensation-Struggle for a Doctrine, 48 Or. L. Rev. 1 (1968); Leighton L. Leighty, The
Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 Land & Water L. Rev. 391
(1970); Morreale, supra note 44; Comment, The Navigation Servitude and the Fifth Amendment, 26
Wayne L. Rev. 1505 (1980).
225. The three main categories of federal activities invoking the servitude are: (1) interference
with the flow of the stream, (2) actions affecting the bed or banks of the stream up to the high water
mark, and (3) deprivation of access to navigable waters. Kelley, supra note 33, § 35.02(c)(1).
226. Morreale, supra note 44, at 20.
227. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967).
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The navigation servitude extends to all lands below the ordinary high
water mark of a navigable river. 28 Rooted in English common law, its
original purpose was to ensure "free and unhindered passage" on
navigable waterways.229 The precise origins of the navigation servitude
are not perfectly clear,23 although the doctrine itself is "largely
settled. 231
Although some cases use the terms "navigation power" and
"navigation servitude" interchangeably, 231 the navigation servitude is
not necessarily coterminous with the navigation power because not all
exercises of the navigation power will relieve the government of the
requirement to pay just compensation.233 The question is whether the
particular property rights in question are burdened with the servitude.234
Congress may choose by statute not to invoke the servitude fully,235 but
any waiver of the servitude must be "unmistakable" to withstand
judicial scrutiny.236
Section 23(b) of the FPA explicitly invokes the navigation power by
making the maintenance of any unlicensed dam in a navigable
waterway illegal. 7 Once a license is denied, the licensee possesses an
unlicensed, illegal obstruction in a navigable waterway. Section 23(b),
by invoking the navigation power, and by implication the navigation
servitude, gives FERC the authority to order the dam removed at the
licensee's expense. 38
228. United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 704 (1987).
229. Morreale, supra note 44, at 3 1.
230. Joseph L. Sax et al., Legal Control of Water Resources 530-31 (2d ed. 1991).
231. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979); see also Kelley, supra note 33,
§ 35.02(c) (summarizing case law on navigation servitude).
232. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 225 (1956) ("The power is a privilege
which we have called 'a dominant servitude'....") (citations omitted).
233. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164, 178-79 (finding that requirement to permit public
access to marina in private pond connected to navigable waters by artificial channel constitutes
taking).
234. Morreale, supra note 44, at 20.
235. FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Co., 347 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1954) (finding dam licensee's
water rights compensable because "[w]hile leaving the way open for the exercise of the federal
servitude ... there is no purpose expressed to seize, abolish or eliminate water rights without
compensation merely by force of the Act itself").
236. United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 707 (1987); see also Lambert Gravel Co. v.
J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 835 F.2d 1105, 1110 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding contractor not liable for breach
of contract due to government's exercise of navigation servitude).
237. 16 U.S.C. § 817(1) (1994).
238. One potential vehicle for administering this requirement is section 10(c) of the FPA, which
requires each licensee to establish and maintain adequate depreciation reserves to ensure the
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A series of early U.S. Supreme Court cases regarding the modification
or removal of bridges as obstructions in a navigable waterway clearly
support this result. 9 The cases make a clear distinction between
situations in which the government takes over the property for its own
use,24 and situations in which the government acts to clear an obstruction
to navigation.24 Generally, the former will require compensation, but the
latter will not.242 In all of these cases, the Court has found that when the
federal government seeks to clear a project from the waterway to restore
navigability, as opposed to taking over and operating the projects for use
and profit, the navigation servitude mandates that the owners remove
their property without compensation.243 Thus, it makes sense to pay the
licensee in cases of federal takeover or license transfer, but not in cases
of license denial and dam removal. Although the navigation servitude
does not automatically operate to free the government from paying
compensation for all exercises of the navigation power,2 clearing an
immediate availability of funds to replace or repair project works to protect navigation, life, health,
or property. 16 U.S.C. § 803(c) (1994). Because dam decommissioning is a means of protecting
navigation and (especially in the case of aging abandoned dams) life, health, and property, FERC
could expressly require licensees to accumulate sufficient funds for dam decommissioning based on
its section 10(c) authority over depreciation funding. 16 U.S.C. § 803(c).
239. See, e.g., Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409, 421 (1917) (holding that
bridge owner had no vested right to compensation for costs of rebuilding bridge for navigation
purposes); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 66-72 (1913) (denying
compensation for lost revenue when government required removal of dam); Hannibal Bridge Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 194, 205 (1911) (holding that under navigation power, Congress may order
removal of obstruction to navigation without paying compensation); Monongahela Bridge Co. v.
United States, 216 U.S. 177, 193-94 (1910) (same); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S.
364, 399-400 (1907) (requiring bridge company to alter bridge built under state license not taking).
240. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 344-45 (1893)
(requiring payment for lock and dam and franchise to take tolls subsequently taken over and
operated by government).
241. See, e.g., Chandler-Dunbar, 229 U.S. at 66-72 (denying compensation for lost revenue
when government required dam removal); Union Bridge, 204 U.S. at 399-400 (approving removal
or alteration, at owner's expense, of bridge built under state license).
242. In Louisville Bridge, the Court distinguished an earlier case requiring payment for
appropriation of a lock and dam by saying that it "was not a case of removing a structure from a
river on the ground that it interfered with navigation, but a taking over of a structure and employing
it in the public use." 242 U.S. at 422-23; see also Catherine P. Connors, Appalachian Electric
Revisited: The Recapture Provision of the Federal Power Act After Nollan and Kaiser Aetna, 40
Drake L. Rev. 533, 558 (1991).
243. To summarize, if FERC decided it wanted to clear the waters on which a project was
located for navigational purposes, then FERC could decline to renew a license and order the
licensee to remove its project equipment from the waters without paying any compensation at
all. Such a decision would fall precisely within the proper application of the federal navigation
servitude.
Connors, supra note 242, at 556-57.
244. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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obstruction from a navigable stream is the type of action that classically
falls within the scope of the navigation servitude.245
IV. CONCLUSION
FERC has the authority under the FPA to deny a license for a
hydroelectric dam and order decommissioning at the licensee's expense,
and to impose uneconomic conditions on a new license. Although the
FPA is silent on the precise question of decommissioning, FERC's broad
statutory authority under the FPA to regulate hydropower development
to protect the public interest, repeatedly upheld by courts, supports the
conclusion that FERC has the power to issue the Policy Statement that
filled a critical gap in the statute. Furthermore, the navigation servitude
supports the conclusion that FERC also has the authority to impose
decommissioning costs on the dam owners if they cannot reach a
negotiated settlement.
Hydroelectric development has always been encumbered with the
requirement that it be in the public interest. When the FWPA was passed
in 1920, the emphasis was on comprehensive hydroelectric development
coupled with strong federal control to prevent monopoly and ensure a
steady supply of power to growing communities. Today, the public
interest demands a sustainable balance between development and the
environment. The Federal Power Act was designed to foster hydro-
electric development by giving licensees security in their investments for
the fifty-year license term. However, the FPA provides for a thorough
reassessment of the dam license when it expires so that future
generations retain control over the use of the nation's waterways.
Tremendous technological advances, as well as changes in the
environment and the public interest, are bound to occur over a fifty-year
license period, and the use of the river must be reassessed regularly.
The hydroelectric industry must learn to work with a multitude of
environmental laws while facing economic pressures concomitant with
deregulation. The industry can no longer rely on a traditional bias in its
favor. As dam licenses continue to expire, dam operators must be ready
to accept new operating conditions that minimize the dams' environ-
mental impacts. In the rare case when a dam's existence is no longer in
the public interest, dam owners should also be willing to come to the
negotiating table ready to forge new creative solutions to dam
245. See supra notes 226, 243 and accompanying text.
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decommissioning. The Policy Statement and the Edwards Dam and
Cushman Project orders should serve as a wake-up call to the industry
that rivers are a public resource, and their use must always be consistent
with the public interest.
126
